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Abstract
This study primarily establishes two things: (1) that monopoly has been
pervasive in the U.S. water transportation industry in both the 19th and 20th
centuries and has led to prices above competitive levels and the adoption of
inefficient technologies and (2) that the competition of railroads has greatly
weakened this monopolistic tendency, leading to lower water transport prices
and fewer inefficient technologies. The study establishes these points using
standard economic theory and extensive historical U.S. data on the behavior of
unions and shipping companies. These gains from competition have been
ignored by researchers studying the contribution of railroads to U.S. economic
growth. Researchers have assumed that if railroads had not been developed, the
long-distance transportation industry would have been competitive. This study
shows that it would not have been. The quantitative estimates of previous
studies thus are likely to have signiﬁcantly understated the gains from the
development of railroads.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.By their nature, water transportation industries are often
subject to monopolization. In some places, for example,
geography produces ports through which all water traffic
must ﬂow. If groups can take control of those ports, they
can charge traffic exorbitant rates. Because of this natural
tendency toward monopoly, water shipment prices often
are higher than they would be if the water transport
industries were competitive. Also, though not generally
recognized, the monopolistic tendency often leads to the
adoption of inefficient technologies in these industries, as,
for example, strong unions of dock workers put restric-
tions on the use of particular equipment in their work.
Within the United States, for much of the nation’s early
history, the water transportation industry has had another
forcepushingtoward monopoly:alackofalternatives. Be-
fore around 1840—and long after, in some parts of the
country—water was the only affordable form of long-dis-
tancetransportation.Goodscouldbemovedbywagon,but
only at great cost. With no other good alternatives, and a
natural tendency toward monopoly in the water transpor-
tation industry, long-distance transportation in the United
States often exhibited a great deal of monopolistic behav-
ior.
Over the last 150 years or so, this behavior has been
greatlyreducedbythedevelopmentoflong-distancetrans-
portation alternativestowater—ﬁrst trainsandthentrucks.
The competition of railroads, especially, has led to lower
long-distance transport prices and fewer inefficient trans-
portation technologies in the United States.
Surprisingly, the huge literature that has quantiﬁed and
debated the gains to the U.S. economy from the devel-
opment of railroads has ignored this contribution of re-
ducing the tendency toward monopoly in long-distance
transportation. Fogel (1964), who pioneered the quantita-
tive assessment of railroads’ contribution to U.S. econom-
ic growth, and virtually all the research following his, has
assumed that if railroads had not been developed, the ex-
isting long-distance transportation industry would have
been competitive. It would not have been. The methods of
these researchers thus fail to capture the gains from com-
petition, of the lowering of prices and the dropping of in-
efficient technologies, spurred by the railroads. And the
resulting quantitative estimates from these studies thus are
likely to signiﬁcantly understate the gains from the devel-
opment of railroads.
The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate com-
petition at work in the long-distance transportation indus-
try. We primarily establish two things: (1) that there is a
strong tendency toward monopoly in the water transport
industry which is evident in the United States in both the
19th and 20th centuries and which has resulted in prices
above competitive levels and the adoption of inefficient
technologies and (2) that the development of railroads has
greatly weakened the tendency toward monopoly through
time, leading to lower water transport prices and fewer in-
efficient technologies.
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After establishing these points, we brieﬂy examine pre-
vious calculations—in particular, Fogel’s—of railroads’
contribution to U.S. economic growth at the end of the
19th century. We argue that in view of our work here, and
other recent work on the costs of monopoly, Fogel’s es-
timate of the economic gain from railroads may be far too
small.
Overview
Let us summarize the material we present to support our
two main points.
That there is, indeed, a strong tendency toward monop-
oly in the water transport industry is developed in two
steps. We ﬁrst argue that structural characteristics of the
water transport industry make it tend toward monopoly.
We then list some of the groups in the U.S. industry that
seem to have had some monopoly power.
In general, three features of the industry make it prone
todevelopmonopolisticbehavior:theabilitytocreatehold-
up points, the existence of scale economies, and extensive
government regulation.
Holdup Points. A group is said to have a holdup point
along a trade route if that group can, in effect, set up a toll
at that point which all traffic must pay. As we argue, U.S.
water transportation routes are susceptible to the creation
of holdup points. In the 19th century, for example, dock
worker unions created such points at places of transship-
ment, where cargo had to be moved from one form of
transportation to another, commonly, from riverboats to
oceangoing vessels. In general, even if large portions of a
trade route are competitive, a group that can create a hold-
up point can extract the same proﬁt as if it had a monopoly
on the entire route.
Scale Economies. For some parts of the water trans-
port industry, the efficient scale of production is large rel-
ative to the size of the market. In the United States, this is
particularly true for coastal routes, where the relevant mar-
ket involves shipment of goods between two cities (on a
city-pair route). In such markets, the efficient scale of pro-
duction may involve multiple vessels (to provide a regular
schedule, for example), yet the number of weekly sailings
between the cities may be fairly small. In this regard, the
coastal shipping market is similar to the airline market.
Concerns about the exercise of market power emerge in
such situations, when the efficient scale of production is
large relative to the size of the market.
GovernmentRegulation.Theremaynotbeanindustry
that is as extensively regulated and protected as the water
transport industry. In the United States, regulations have
prohibited foreign competition throughout the industry.
These government restrictions have made the industry’s
monopoly power greater.
Given these structural features, water transport indus-
tries are prone to monopolistic behavior. We look here at
the U.S. industry in the 19th and 20th centuries. The three
main water transport systems in the United States can be
seen in Chart 1. One system is that formed by the Missis-
sippi and Ohiorivers (and smaller riversthat are tributaries
to them). Another system is that formed by the Great
Lakes and the Erie Canal that runs through upstate New
York to the Hudson River at Albany. The third is the
coastal system, made up of the Atlantic Ocean along the
East Coast of the United States, the Gulf of Mexico along
the South, and (not shown on the chart) the Paciﬁc Ocean
along the West Coast.
All three of these systems have had groups with some
monopoly power. On the Mississippi-Ohio river system,
there were powerful dock worker unions in New Orleans;
therewasalleged collusionamongalliances ofwarehouse-
men (known as combinations) in New Orleans; and there
were riverboat pilot unions with apparently some powerover wages. On the coastal system, along the East Coast
and the Gulf of Mexico, there was a warehousemen com-
bination in Buffalo, New York; there were seamen’s
unions on the boats of the Great Lakes, powerful dock
worker unions in many ports, and shipping combinations
on the Great Lakes, though these were not as successful as
those on the coasts. However, this system did have the
Tugboat Trust, a company that controlled nearly all towing
on the Great Lakes.
We show that some of these groups used their mo-
nopolypowertochargepricessigniﬁcantlyabovecompeti-
tive levels in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The hourly
wage rates paid to dock workers in New Orleans, on the
Great Lakes, and in New York were at various times from
two to three times higher than those paid to other freight
handlers.Someofthesedockworkersearnedhourlywages
that were among the highest in their areas.
This suggests that these dock jobs were very valuable
to the workers, and this is borne out by the initiation fees
charged to enter the dock worker unions. For example, the
fee to enter the cotton screwmen’s union (a union of dock
workers who stowed, or screwed, cotton into the holds of
ships) in New Orleans in 1884 was $50. On the Great
Lakes, the most common (modal) initiation fee for long-
shoremen’slocalsinthe early20thcenturywas $50.These
initiation fees are extremely high by historical standards. It
wouldhave taken approximatelyfrom 7 to10 times longer
for a worker (working at the unskilled wages of the time)
to earn these dock initiation fees than to earn the mid–20th
century modal initiation fee (of $50) for unions in the
American Federation of Labor (AFL).
The monopoly power of dock worker unions during
this period was quantitatively signiﬁcant in the sense that
it raised the overall water transportation price a signiﬁcant
amount. For example, the monopoly proﬁt earned by
longshoring unions in New Orleans (that is, their actual
earnings less the earnings of similarly skilled workers) in
the mid-1880s amounted to roughly 20–30 percent of to-
tal transport charges on cotton (longshoring charges plus
steamshipfreightcharges)fromNewOrleanstoNewYork.
We also show that some of the groups with monopoly
power in the U.S. water transport industry chose to use in-
efficient technologies. That a monopolist will choose an
inefficient technology is certainly an unconventional idea,
but it is one with theoretical and factual support, which we
discuss below. Moreover, we present evidence that dock
workerunionsclearlychosetouseinefficienttechnologies.
For example, dock worker unions in New Orleans and on
the Paciﬁc Coast had work rules that limited the use of
equipment. Other union work rules resulted in “a waste of
energy and hard work,” according to the head of the Pa-
ciﬁc Coast longshoremen’s union, testifying to the U.S.
Congress (quoted in Ferguson 1961). After this Paciﬁc
Coast union was formed in 1934, new work rules signiﬁ-
cantly slowed the pace of work. Labor productivity (tons
loaded and unloaded per hour) fell dramatically.
The development of railroads in the 19th century great-
ly reduced this tendency toward monopoly in the water
transport industry. U.S. water transportation systems were
susceptible to the creation of holdup points. But the power
atsuchpointswasalsosusceptibletobeinggreatlyreduced
by railroads. Take the example of shipping cotton grown
near the Mississippi River, in Louisiana, to New York. Be-
fore railroads, if dock worker unions raised wages in New
Orleans, so that the coastal route to New York became
more expensive, the only other option for cotton growers
was to go up the Mississippi to the Erie Canal. With the
development of railroads, many more options became
available. Now the cotton could be transported overland to
other ports on the Gulf of Mexico—say, Galveston, Texas,
or Mobile, Alabama—and then shipped to New York.
Without the railroads, this was not economical because of
the extremely high cost of wagon transportation. More-
over, with railroads, the cotton didn’t have to go to any
port at all. It could simply be taken overland to New York.
We present evidence that this ability of railroads to
divert traffic to different ports or directly overland greatly
reduced monopoly power in ports, leading to lower water
transport prices and fewer inefficient technologies in the
industry.
First, we discuss prices. We describe examples of how
competitionfromrailroadshelpedlowerthewagesofdock
workers and thefees of combinations. Theexamples come
from all the major water transport systems and both the
19th and 20th centuries.
• By about 1880, railroads began diverting water traffic
from New Orleans in a signiﬁcant way. Strong pres-
sure was put on dock union wages. From 1885 to
1905, the wages of unionized cotton screwmen in
New Orleans fell as much as 20 percent while general
wages in that area were increasing.
• Late in the 19th century, railroads running from Bal-
timore (and Philadelphia) to Chicago were diverting
traffic from the Erie Canal, and that competition led
Buffalo warehousemen to reduce their charges.
• Early in the 20th century, railroads diverting traffic
clearlybrokestrikesofdockworkersinNewOrleans,
in Boston, and on the Paciﬁc Coast, thus preventing
these workers from increasing their wages.
• And in the early 1960s, in recognition of the railroad
competition that U.S. coastal shipping faced, long-
shoremen on the U.S. East Coast agreed to charge
coastal water traffic up to one-quarter of what the
longshoremen charged foreign traffic.
Second, we show that railroad competition led to the
dropping of inefficient technologies in the water transport
industry. Some dock worker unions in New Orleans
changed their work rules over the period 1885–1905 so as
to increase the pace of work 20 percent. Some unions also
dropped work rules which required unskilled work to be
done by skilled workers.
Tendencies Toward Monopoly
Inthis section,we arguethat thereare generallystrong ten-
dencies toward monopoly in water transportation systems.
The ﬁrst part of this section focuses on structural features
of the industry that make it ripe for monopoly. The second
part itemizes various groups in the industry in the United
States in the 19th and 20th centuries that the evidence sug-
gests had some monopoly power.
Susceptibility
Here we discuss three features of the water transport in-
dustry that generally make it tend toward monopolistic be-
havior: the ability to create holdup points, the existence of
scale economies, and extensive government regulation.Holdup Points
A holdup point is a simple concept. Suppose goods are
shipped between points A and B such as in Chart 2. In the
chart, there are several routes from A to B. But there are
somepoints,suchaspointH,throughwhichallcargomust
pass. We say that there is a holdup point at H if a group is
able to capture this point and charge everyone who passes
through it a fee, or toll. Everyone trying to travel from Ato
B, that is, has no choice but to pay the group in order to do
so.
Let us call the set of all routes between two points A
and B that go through point H the H-system of routes. In
Chart2,ofcourse,allroutesbelongtotheH-system.How-
ever, one can imagine drawing an arc that goes from A to
B but lies everywhere below the routes on the chart and
has no point in common with them other than A and B.
This route would not be part of the H-system of routes.
Suppose there is a holdup point at H, but the rest of the
H-system is competitive; that is, there are no other holdup
points,andpricescharged tousevessels aresetat marginal
cost. Using arguments from the industrial organization
literature, we can see, straightforwardly, that the proﬁt-
maximizing toll revenue at H is the same as what the mo-
nopolyproﬁtwouldbeiftheentireH-systemweremonop-
olized. This follows the standard argument that when there
is a monopoly over one input and the technology is Leon-
tief with respect to other inputs, the monopolist has no in-
centive to vertically integrate into the other inputs (Carlton
and Perloff 1990). The technology of getting from A to B
here is a ﬁxed-coefficient one, since for every unit trans-
ported from A to B, one unit needs to go through H.
TwocharacteristicsofU.S.watertransportationsystems
in the period we are studying made them susceptible to
groups creating holdup points along them. First, for nearly
all commodities, either there was only one relevant system
on which to ship goods, as in Chart 2, or there were just
two systems. In other words, for many products, there was
little competition between systems. Second, along these
systems, there were natural holdup points at points of
transshipment, again, places where cargo is moved from
one mode of transport to another, for example, from a
riverboat to an oceangoing ship. The location of transship-
ment points is determined by geography—where a river
hits an ocean, such as at New Orleans, or where a canal
hits a lake, such as at Buffalo.
Consider the example of shipping cotton grown near
the Mississippi River, in Louisiana, to New York. In most
circumstances, before railroads arrived, the relevant route
involved shipping the cotton a relatively short distance
down the Mississippi River and then on through the Gulf
of Mexico and up the East Coast to New York. Along this
route, there was a natural holdup point in New Orleans,
where the cotton had to be transferred from a riverboat to
anoceangoingvessel.Ifworkerscouldsuccessfullyunion-
ize the docks at New Orleans, they could create a holdup
point. If a single ﬁrm or a small group could buy up the
docks at the port, it could create a holdup point. Besides
that, as an intermediate stage of the transshipment process,
goods were often transferred to warehouses. If a group
could monopolize the warehouses in New Orleans, that
group, too, could create a holdup point.
IfgroupsbegantoturnNewOrleansintoaholduppoint
and started raising prices, then cotton growers, of course,
had the option of using other water transportation systems
that did not include New Orleans. But these options were
limited: There was only one other water system from the
middle of the country to the East Coast, the system that
included the Erie Canal. For a cotton grower in Louisiana,
therefore, costs in New Orleans would have had to get
very high before the system through the Erie Canal would
look attractive.
For other goods, like grain grown in Ohio, the two sys-
tems werebetter substitutes. But even herethere were only
two water transport systems, the one including New Or-
leans and the one with the Erie Canal. If one group were
to set up a holdup point in New Orleans and another group




If grain was to move north by the water system that
included the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal, then Buffalo
was a natural holdup point. How about the possibilities
of holdups in originating ports on the Great Lakes, like
Chicago? The transshipment point at Chicago was not
unavoidable like that at, say, New Orleans. If groups in
Chicago attempted to charge too much, there were other
options: Milwaukee, Toledo, and Cleveland.
But delivering grain to another port instead of Chicago
may not have been a great option. Again, without rail-
roads, diverting traffic from one port to another could be
extremely expensive. Moreover, if groups could organize
throughout the Great Lakes ports, there would be no es-
caping them. Some groups did organize throughout these
ports. For example, one group, the Tugboat Trust, con-
trolled most of the towing services throughout the Great
Lakes. Also, the longshoremen’s union organized most of
the docks on the lakes. According to Hoagland (1917, p.
104), “by 1899 almost every man working on the Lake
Erie docks was a member of that organization” (the Inter-
national Longshoremen’s Association). Since some of
these groups were organized throughout the Great Lakes
ports and diverting traffic without railroads could be ex-
pensive, the possibility of holdup points in Chicago and
other originating ports was signiﬁcant.
Scale Economies
Another feature of the water transport industry also gives
it potential to be monopolistic: the efficient scale of pro-
duction in this industry is sometimes large relative to the
size of the market. When this sort of situation exists, ship-
ping companies can charge rates above competitive levels.
We argue that this situation did exist in some parts of the
U.S. water transport industry in the 19th and 20th centu-
ries.
This situation particularly applied on the coastal routes.
Here the relevant market was the shipment of a wide range
of goods between two cities (again, a city-pair route).
3 As
we shall see, many city-pair routes were relatively small
markets. Some of those markets had only a few sailings
per week.
There are also reasons to think that the efficient scale of
productionincoastalshippingwaslarge.Itisreasonableto
think that this activity might require multiple vessels. Con-
sumers of transportation services value a regular schedule
of departures and a variety of departure times. Having a
large scale of operation makes these features possible.
In coastal routes, then, the efficient scale of productionwasprobably largerelative tothemarket.
4Mostindividual
markets (city-pair routes) would be served by a single
steamship line. We demonstrate this point in Table 1,
which lists the steamship lines operating in 1881 between
Baltimore and other ports along the East Coast. The table
shows that each market (that is, Baltimore and the other
city of the pair) was served by only one line, except New
York, which was served by two. Moreover, most of these
lines had multiple steamships in service; for example, sev-
enoperatedbetweenBaltimoreandNorfolk.Notealsothat
the number of trips between city-pairs each month varies
widely, from 5 to 60. But about half of the city-pairs had
10 or fewer monthly trips. This means that ships sailed
betweenthosecity-pairslessoftenthanthreetimesaweek.
This pattern is consistent with the view that the scale of
entry in this industry is large relative to the market.
The historical coastal shipping market likely shares
many similarities with today’s airline industry. In the air-
lineindustry, manycity-pairs are served bya single carrier,
and some think that this market power is exploited by the
airlines.
Regulation
Still another feature of the water transport industry that
makes it strongly conducive to a monopolistic tendency is
the high degree of government regulation it generally has
had. In most countries throughout the world, the water
transportindustryisextensivelyregulatedandprotectedby
the government.
This feature of the industry is, of course, unlike the oth-
er two: it is not a primitive feature of the technology as are
holdup points and scale economies. But government reg-
ulation is such a striking feature and plays such a signif-
icant role in the industry that it needs to be acknowledged.
The U.S. regulations we now describe have been in force
invaryingdegreessincethenationwasfounded;theyhave
thus been a more or less permanent ﬁxture of the indus-
try’s environment, albeit one that was chosen in the polit-
ical forum and not by nature.
We discuss just three types of laws that have protected
this industry in the United States. First, laws have prohib-
itedanyforeign shipsfromshippingbetweenanytwoU.S.
ports;foreigncompetitionondomesticrouteshasbeenout-
lawed. Second, U.S. shipping companies have been re-
quired to purchase ships from U.S. shipbuilders; foreign
competition in shipbuilding has been outlawed. And third,
U.S. shipping companies have had to hire U.S. citizens to
ﬁll a portion of their crews;
5 foreign competition for many
jobs has been outlawed.
Given the technological considerations that made the
water transport industry ripe for monopoly, government
restrictions on foreign competition contributed signiﬁcant-
ly to the monopolistic character of this industry. As men-
tioned, scale economies were particularly likely to be sub-
stantial in coastal trade. By outlawing foreign ships on this
system, the monopoly problem was exacerbated. That for-
eign ﬁrms could not sell ships in the United States tended
to increase the power of any groups in the domestic ship-
building industry with monopolistic tendencies. We have
not explored the structure of the domestic shipbuilding
industry in detail, but it had unions in the 19th century
(Heinrich 1997).
6 That U.S. shipping ﬁrms could not hire
totally foreign crews tended to increase the power of any
seamen’s unions in the domestic shipping industry.
Groups
We have seen that there are structural features of the wa-
ter transport industry that push it toward monopoly. Now
we describe two types of groups in the U.S. industry that
seem to have had some monopoly power: unions and
combinations. We also brieﬂy discuss the U.S. history of
these groups.
Unions
Some unions of laborers in the water transport industry
seem to have had signiﬁcant power to inﬂuence their wa-
gesandworking conditionsintheUnitedStatesinboththe
19th and 20th centuries.
Dock Workers. Strikes of dock workers in New York
date from at least 1836 (Barnes 1915, p. 93).
Dock worker unions in New Orleans date from at least
1850 (Arnesen 1991, p. 21). These unions wielded signiﬁ-
cant power throughout most of the period from the U.S.
Civil War to the early 20th century, as the evidence below
indicates. After the 1881 dock worker strike, the mayor of
New Orleans observed that the strike’s success demon-
strated the “weakness of the power of the state when a
few labor organizations could do as they pleased, and set
at deﬁance law and order, and stop the business of such
a large city as New Orleans” (quoted in Arnesen 1991, p.
72). The unions involved in the movement of cotton were
particularly strong. A Chicago newspaper observed that
“no such a monopoly ever existed before” (quoted in
Arnesen 1987, p. 142).
Dock worker unions on the Great Lakes date from at
least 1870 (Commons 1905, p. 60). Late in the 19th cen-
tury, these unions appear to have had substantial power, as
the evidence below indicates.
RiverboatPilots.TheUnitedStateshadunionsofriver-
boat pilots as early as 1841 (Hunter 1949, p. 468). There
is as yet no hard evidence about the extent to which such
unions were able to raise wages above competitive levels.
However,someclaimedduringthe1850sthattheriverboat
pilots, who were empowered to certify new pilots under
the Steamboat Inspection Act of 1852, were refusing to
certify new pilots, thereby signiﬁcantly increasing the
wages of existing pilots (Hunter 1949, p. 471–72).
Seamen. Unions on the vessels of the Great Lakes (as
opposed to on the docks there) date from at least 1854
(Hoagland 1917, p. 32). On the Great Lakes, the unions of
workers on boats during the latter part of the 19th century
do not seem to have been as successful as those on the
docks.Seamenunionswerevigorouslyresistedbyemploy-
er groups. Late in the 19th century, there was much vio-
lence between employers and union supporters. Some of
these unions achieved closed shop status.
Combinations
Another type of group in the U.S. water transport industry
also seems to have had signiﬁcant power to inﬂuence pric-
es in this industry: combinations. These are alliances of in-
dividuals or companies which teamed up in order to better
achieve their common ends. We discuss ﬁrst warehouse-
men combinations, then shipping line combinations.
Warehousemen. Some observers at the time thought
that warehousemen in Chicago, Buffalo, and New Orleans
had some market power in the 19th century. (See, for
example, Veblen’s 1892 discussion, some of which we re-
view later.)By the 1890s, the power of warehousemen in New Or-
leans was a subject of great concern among merchants in
that city. Their business had declined as cotton shipments
were diverted in largenumbers away from the port of New
Orleans. In discussing the reasons for the decline, Hester
(1896,p.4)describestheeffects ofboththepowerof labor
unions in the city to set their own wages and work rules
(which we alluded to above) and the agreements among
warehousemen there to follow similar pricing policies:
By far the most serious impediments have been the labor
problem and [cotton] press and warehouse combination.
These were actually strangling the local cotton trade. For a
long time it was simply a question of “stand and deliver.”
Certain ﬁxed charges and rules were determined on, and
each and every bale consigned to a New Orleans merchant
must abide by them. Expediency was not considered; the
cotton must stand the tax, or, if not, go elsewhere for a
market or be shipped “through.” The labor question reached
a point in 1895 culminating in serious disturbances on the
levee front, the troubles curtailing the gross movement of
cotton that season about 500,000 bales. The result has been,
however, to clear the atmosphere in that respect, and con-
ditions are now more favorable than they have been for
many years. The press and warehouse combination has con-
tinued in existence up to the present time. While its opera-
tions have been injurious to New Orleans, and while its
charges have been potent factors in restricting the local trade,
it would not be just to set upon its members the seal of con-
demnation. The real fault lay in existing conditions, of which
they avail themselves to secure the best possible returns for
the capital invested. They did what any and all merchants in
any city or section would have done.
Hester seems to know about holdup points.
Shipping Lines. Off the dock, combinations and col-
lusive practices in ocean shipping were common through-
out the world in both the 19th and 20th centuries (McGee
1961). This was true of U.S. ocean shipping as well.
The Gulf of Mexico had a lot of collusive activity
amongsteamshiplines.Baughmanreportsittherebothbe-
fore and after the U.S. Civil War (1968a, p. 137; 1968b).
According to Baughman (1968b, pp. 374–75), “in 1878
the Morgan and Mallory lines signed the ﬁrst of a series of
secret agreements equilibrating New York and New Or-
leans sea rates to Texas. Henceforth, they abandoned rate
cutting as a competitive tactic at sea—except against third
parties.”
Early in the 20th century, the U.S. Congress appointed
a commission to investigate combinations and collusive
practicesintheentireU.S.domesticandforeigntrade.This
group was known as the Alexander Commission. After
studying the U.S. domestic coastal trade, this commission
(U.S. Congress 1914, p. 421) concluded that “competition
in rates between domestic water lines . . . has been . . .
effectively eliminated.”
The Alexander Commission’s report cites several fac-
tors to support that conclusion. Concentration of owner-
ship of shipping lines was very high.
7 Not only that, but
the few existing lines stayed out of each other’s way. Ac-
cording to the commission, there was only one regular
water carrier between New York and the ports of Portland
(Maine), Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Wil-
mington,Charleston,Savannah,Jacksonville,andNewOr-
leans.Thecommission(p.370)reportedthat“Galvestonis
the only important Gulf port which has two services from
New York—the Mallory and Morgan lines—but these . . .
work in absolute harmony.”
8
The few big lines that operated in the U.S. coastal trade
also had methods of working together to crush new en-
trants, the Alexander Commission reported. One method
was the use of “ﬁghting ships” (U.S. Congress 1914, p.
393). If a new steamship line attempted to enter a route,
the established lines, or combinations, would add steam-
ships to that route, called ﬁghting ships, which had only
one purpose: to drive the new entrant from the market.
Sometimestheestablishedcombinationswouldmoveeven
before entry had occurred. For example, the commission
reports (p. 393) that “Mr. F. S. Groves stated that at about
the time of the organization of his line [the Philadelphia &
GulfLine]theSouthernSteamshipCo.,operatingbetween
PhiladelphiaandTampa,promptlyadvertisedtheextension
of its service to New Orleans, and through this act was
instrumental in stopping subscriptions to the stock of the
Philadelphia & Gulf Line.”
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TheAlexanderCommissionalsostudiedcollusiveprac-
tices on the Great Lakes. In most Great Lakes shipping
markets, the extent of these practices seems to have been
less than on the coastal routes. In one market, however, it
mayhavebeengreater.Accordingtothecommission(U.S.
Congress 1914, p. 340), “the Great Lakes Towing Com-
pany controls exclusively the towing of all the Lake Erie
ports of any importance and also that of Chicago, South
Chicago, Gary, Duluth and the Soo.” Formed in 1899, the
Great Lakes Towing Company, commonly called the Tug-
boat Trust, was found to be in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1910.
Effects of Monopoly
In this section, we ﬁrst present evidence that some of the
groupslistedabovewereabletousetheirmonopolypower
to raise prices above competitive levels in both the 19th
and 20th centuries. We then show that the use of that
power translated into huge markups on costs at transship-
ment points, which added signiﬁcantly to the total costs of
transportation. Finally, we present evidence that monopoly
power in the water transport industry also led to the adop-
tion of inefficient technology.
High Prices
Here we show that a major component of shipping costs,
the price of labor, was affected by the monopoly power of
unions. We show that hourly wages earned by dock work-
ers in New Orleans, in New York, and on the Great Lakes
were signiﬁcantly higher than competitive wages would
have been. We do this by comparing the wages of dock
workers to those of workers in the same area, at the same
time, who did jobs of comparable skill.
Dock Wages in New Orleans...
We ﬁrst compare the wages of union dock workers in New
Orleans in 1904–5 to those of other unionized workers in
New Orleans, including those in the railroad industry. We
then compareunion dock worker wagesto wagesof work-
ers in manufacturing establishments in New Orleans. The
conclusionisthatin1904–5,thedockworkersearnedsub-
stantial premiumsover the earnings ofmost ofthese work-
ers and had some of the highest hourly wage rates of all
such workers in New Orleans.
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The Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor for Lou-
isiana—1904–05 (Lee 1906) lists the agreements reachedbetween various employer groups and unions in New
Orleans in 1904–5. We display the hourly wage rates in
some of those agreements in Chart 3.
11 Clearly, the freight
handlers on the docks received substantially more than
railroad freight handlers. The cotton screwmen (who re-
ceived 56¢ per hour) were skilled workers. But the other
types of dock freight handlers arguably were not skilled.
Yet longshoremen received from two to three times their
railroad counterparts (between 40¢ and 50¢ vs. between
16¢ and 20¢).
The teamsters (or drivers) on the docks also received
highwagesrelativetootherunionizedteamsters.Thedray-
men—who hauled goods by cart, or dray—received 30¢
an hour; the coal wheelers, 40¢ an hour. These wages are
from one and a half to two times larger than those of the
unionized teamsters in the carriage industry (20¢) and the
beer industry (21¢).
While railroad worker unions were particularly weak
compared to dock worker unions, the chart suggests they
werenotweakcomparedtootherunions.Machinistsinthe
railroad unions received about what machinists received in
aunionagreementwiththemachineshops(34¢vs.33¢for
inside work and vs. 39¢ for outside).
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With wages between 40¢ and 50¢ an hour, the long-
shoremenearnedmorethansomeoftheunionizedworkers
in skilled trades: union agreements signed in 1904–5 put
the wages of engineers at 33¢ and, again, those of machin-
ists between 33¢ and 39¢.
We next compare the wages of dock workers in New
Orleans to those in manufacturing establishments in New
Orleans (reported in Lee 1906). Averages for some types
of these workers are also displayed in Chart 3. We do not
know how many of these manufacturing workers were
unionized. These data seem to tell the same story as those
from union agreements.
Teamsters on the docks did very well compared to
teamsters who drove for manufacturing establishments.
While teamsters on New Orleans docks earned 30¢–40¢
an hour, hourly wages for teamsters in manufacturing av-
eraged 19¢.
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The hourly pay for general help and laborers in manu-
facturing (not shown on the chart) averaged 15¢ an hour.
At 40¢–50¢ an hour, the wages of longshoremen, who
may arguably be classiﬁed as unskilled, were signiﬁcantly
above the wages of unskilled workers in other industries.
The longshoremen (and, hence, the screwmen) on the
docks also earned more than many of the skilled workers
in manufacturing establishments. For example, longshore-
men earned more than machinists and engineers in manu-
facturing, who both earned 29¢ an hour on average.
Insummary, thehourlywage ratespaidtoNewOrleans
dock workers in 1904–5 were substantially higher than
those paid to freight handlers, teamsters, and unskilled la-
bor in other industries, the jobs that were closest to most of
the dock worker jobs. They were also higher than skilled
wage jobs like machinists and engineers.
. . . And Elsewhere
The New Orleans wage differences existed elsewhere in
the U.S. water transport industry too. Dock worker wages
were also substantially higher than the wages of other
freight handlers and unskilled workers in New York and
on the Great Lakes. In Chart 4, we display some of the
wages in these areas.
Barnes (1915) reports that in 1874, longshoremen in
New York were paid 40¢ an hour, and those in rail yards
17.5¢ an hour. Barnes (1915, p. 96) mentions this in the
context that the longshoremen wages were about to be
attacked by employers. The longshoremen, he says, “re-
ceived 40 cents for day work, 80 cents for night work,
and $1.00 for Sundays. When work was steady there was
the possibility of large earnings. Why, it was asked [by
New York merchants], should the price for handling cargo
freight be so high when railroad freight was handled at the
rate of 17 1/2 cents an hour.”
Kleven (1941, p. 454) states that unionized dock work-
ers on the Great Lakes who loaded lumber onto boats
(whom he calls “shovers”) earned 50¢ an hour through the
1890s and into the 20th century. He also discusses the
wage of “common laborers” in the lumber industry and
argues that it ranged from 12¢ to 14¢ an hour. The shovers
obviously earned a substantial premium over unskilled la-
bor.
Discussing the early 20th century, Commons (1905),
too, says that “lumber loaders” (shovers) earned 50¢ an
hour on the docks; he puts the wages of longshoremen
handling lumber at 60¢ an hour and dock iron shoveler
wages at 55¢–60¢ an hour. Commons says railroad freight
handlers earned only 17¢–20¢ an hour.
Union Initiation Fees
Dock work was often sporadic and sometimes subject to
danger, which might seem to make it less attractive to
workers in general. But these jobs were highly valuable to
workers, which is clear from the large initiation fees they
had to pay to enter the unions.
The initiation fees in some of the late 19th century dock
worker unions were large measured either by the time
required to earn those fees or by historical standards. In
Table 2, we present the time required to earn the union in-
itiation fees by workers in various occupations. For histor-
ical comparison, we also present the time required to earn
the fees to enter general labor unions after World War II.
The fee to enter the New Orleans cotton screwmen’s
union in 1884 was $50. Railroad freight handlers at the
timewould havehad towork about 333hours tomake that
much; unskilled workers would have needed 500 hours.
Commons (1905) reports a range of fees for longshore-
men’s locals on the Great Lakes in the early 20th century,
but he also puts the modal fee at $50. In this later period,
railroad freight handlers would have had to work about
250–90 hours to make enough to join that union, and un-
skilled workers would have needed 333 hours. These are
substantial fees for a worker to pay to join a union.
These fees are also high by historical standards. Taft
(1946) reports a range of fees for AFL unions after World
War II and puts the modal fee at $50. At that time, it
wouldhave takenaworkerapproximately46and49hours
workingatrailroadwagesandunskilledwages,respective-
ly, to earn this fee. Hence, it would have taken approxi-
mately from 7 to 10 times longer for a worker (working at
the unskilled wages of the time) to earn these dock ini-
tiation fees than to earn the mid–20th century modal fee
for AFL unions.
High Transport Costs
The evidence above indicates that some groups at trans-
shipment points had signiﬁcant monopoly power. But didthis translate into signiﬁcantly higher costs for the entire
water transportation system? Here we argue that it did.
Transshipment Costs
We begin by showing that transshipment costs were a big
share of total water transportation charges. In Table 3, we
present some late 19th century water transportation charg-
es,includingportcharges(formovingcargobetweenports
and vessels) and freight charges (for moving cargo across
water) for two routes: the northern route from Chicago to
New York (from the Great Lakes to Buffalo to the Erie
Canal) and the southern route from New Orleans to New
York (a coastal route). The port charges on the northern
route amounted to roughly half the freight charges, 10.5¢
per bushel vs. 20¢ per bushel (Lee 1938, p. 173). On the
southern route, the port charges were even larger (Hester
1896, p. 4); they were greater than or equal to the freight
charges.
14
In Table 4, we present our own estimates of transship-
ment costs on cotton moving from New Orleans to New
York in 1885. In contrast to Hester (1896), we want to
consider cotton that comes into New Orleans on a river-
boat. (Hester considered only cotton coming in on trains.)
Also, we will make the calculations for a period 10 years
earlier than Hester did, for a time when union wages were
higher (and had not yet come under pressure from the
railroads).
To do our own calculations, ﬁrst let’s see what type of
costs a bale of cotton would incur as it was moved from
New Orleans to New York. The charges in the port of
New Orleans began atthe wharf, where riverboatsthat had
traveled down the Mississippi River were unloaded. The
screwmen were paid to unload the boats and the long-
shoremen were paid to take the cotton from the screwmen
and place it on the wharf.
15 Next the cotton was transport-
ed from the wharf where the riverboats had landed, per-
haps initially to warehouses. These services were provided
by the teamsters on the docks, the draymen. Cotton stored
in warehouses was handled by the cotton yardmen. Other
dock workers may have had roles.
Lastly, the draymen transferred the cotton to the wharfs
where the ocean steamships were located. Then the cotton
neededtobeloadedontothosesteamships.Thelongshore-
men handed the cotton up to the screwmen, who screwed
it into the ships. The fueling of the ships was provided by
the coal wheelers. The cotton was then steamed to New
York.
Though we know that all of these groups had strong
unions—that is, the screwmen, the longshoremen, the
draymen, the cotton yardmen, the coal wheelers, and
others—and we know the hourly wages for many of these
groups, at this point we can only approximate the per bale
charges for the screwmen and the longshoremen.
These approximate charges in 1885 are displayed in
Table 4.
16 For loading vessels, the screwmen had a union
limit of 75 bales per day per gang. Gangs (of ﬁve mem-
bers) were paid $31 a day. At 75 bales, the cost to the
shipper of the screwmen’s work is, then, 41¢ a bale. Now,
in loading vessels, the longshoremen handed cotton up to
the screwmen. We do not know how many longshoremen
served the screwmen, though we do know that the long-
shoremen were often idle and had as a work rule that they
were paid during these idle periods. If one longshoreman
served one screwman, then the longshoremen’s charge
would have been 33¢ per bale (5 men × 50¢ per hour ×
10 hours = $25 per day, or 33¢ per bale).
For unloading vessels, we do not know the rate at
which the screwmen handed bales down to the longshore-
men. But suppose, ﬁrst, that it was the same as the loading
rate, 75 bales per gang per day. Then the screwmen’s un-
loading charge would have been the same as their loading
charge, 41¢ per bale. If one longshoreman served one
screwman to unload as well as load, then the longshore-
men’s charge also would have been the same as their load-
ing charge, 33¢ per bale. These four charges are in the ﬁrst
column of ﬁgures in Table 4.
But we might be wrong about the one-to-one ratio of
longshoremen and screwmen and about the rate at which
screwmen unloaded vessels. Suppose, instead, that one
longshoreman served two screwmen and that the screw-
men unloaded vessels at the rate of 100 bales a day. Then
the screwmen’s charge for loading would still have been
41¢ per bale, but the longshoremen’s charge for loading
75 bales would have been 16.7¢ per bale (2.5 men × 50¢
per hour × 10 hours = $12.50 per day, or 16.7¢ per bale).
The screwmen’s charge for unloading would have been
31¢ per bale ($31 for 100 bales), and the longshoremen’s
charge for unloading would have been 12.5¢ ($12.50 for
100 bales). These four charges are in the second column
of ﬁgures in Table 4.
Recall Table 3, which includes Hester’s (1896) report
that screwing cotton into a ship cost 50¢ per bale in 1895.
The charges in Table 4 for loading cotton into ships in
1885 range between 57.7¢ and 74¢ per bale (the sum of
thescrewmenandlongshoremenfees).Themid-1880swas
an exceptionally strong period for the unions, and union
wages fell between 1885 and 1895. So we feel conﬁdent
that our estimates of the charges are approximately correct
and that the actual charges may have been in the middle of
our range of estimates.
Markups
Let us now turn to estimating the markups, or monopoly
proﬁts, in these charges. We estimate the monopoly proﬁt
earned by the unions in unloading and loading activities
and then estimate how large that monopoly proﬁt was rel-
ative to total transport charges (unloading and loading plus
ocean freight) to New York.
The total unloading and loading charges in New Or-
leans, if we use the assumptions in the ﬁrst column of
Table 4, were $1.48. To calculate the per bale monopoly
proﬁt earned by the unions, let’s ﬁrst calculate their mo-
nopoly proﬁt per hour worked, that is, actual earnings less
earnings of similarly skilled workers. In the mid-1880s
(Table 6), the screwmen earned 67¢ an hour. If we sup-
pose that their skill level is comparable to that of, say,
machinists and engineers, who earned union wages of
about33¢an hour,then abouthalfof thescrewmen’s wage
is monopoly proﬁt. The longshoremen earned 50¢ an hour
at this time. If we suppose that their skill level is compara-
ble to that of freight handlers on the railroad, who earned
15¢ an hour, then the longshoremen’s monopoly proﬁt is
about 35¢ an hour, or about two-thirds of their wage.
Let’s now calculate the monopoly proﬁt per bale. Total
monopoly proﬁt equals half of the screwmen’s per bale
charges and two-thirds of the longshoremen’s, or 41¢ +
44¢ = 85¢.
With the lowest steamship freight charge to New York,totalunloadingandloadingplusfreightchargeswas$2.73.
Monopoly proﬁt thus amounts to 31 percent of total trans-
portcharges($0.85÷$2.73).If,instead,weusethehighest
steamship freight charge, monopoly proﬁt is 24 percent of
total charges ($0.85 ÷ $3.48).
The total unloading and loading charge in New Orleans
if we use the assumptions in the second column of Table
4 was $1.01. Total monopoly proﬁt equals half the screw-
men’s charges and two-thirds of the longshoremen’s, or
36¢ + 19¢ = 55¢. With the lowest steamship freight
charge, then, monopoly proﬁt amounts to 24 percent of
total transport charges ($0.55 ÷ $2.26). If, instead, we use
the highest steamship charge to New York, monopoly
proﬁt is 18 percent of total charges ($0.55 ÷ $3.01).
Thus, as Table 4 displays, the monopoly proﬁt earned
by New Orleans dock worker unions in unloading and
loading activities may have been between 18 and 31 per-
cent of total transport costs.
Inefficient Technology
Higher than competitive prices and proﬁts are the conven-
tional types of evidence that a monopoly exists in an in-
dustry. But monopolies can have other negative effects as
well.Herewepresentevidencethatgroupswithmonopoly
power in the U.S. water transport industry chose to adopt
inefficient technologies. Since the idea that a monopolist
would choose an inefficient technology is not commonly
known, we start by presenting some recent theory that
indicates a link between monopoly and the choice of in-
efficient technology. We follow that with some evidence
speciﬁc to the U.S. water transport industry.
General Theory
An old literature argues that a monopolist will be ineffi-
cient (Leibenstein 1966). This old literature does not de-
velop a theory about why this is true, but rather just asserts
a link between market power and inefficiency and gives it
a name (X-inefficiency). More recently, progress has been
made in understanding this link.
Standardeconomictheorysaysthattomaximizeproﬁts,
ﬁrms—even monopolists—try to minimize costs. Why
would a monopolist choose to be any less productively ef-
ﬁcient than a competitive ﬁrm? Recent literature assumes
that there is some sort of friction in the extraction of mo-
nopoly rents, some limit in the space of contracting pos-
sibilities. In these models of inefficiency, if the monopolist
weretochooseamoreproductivelyefficientmeansofpro-
duction (and thereby increase the total pie), it would some-
how lose (and decrease its particular slice of the pie).
Recent work that has this feature includes that of
Holmes and Schmitz (1995, 2001) and Parente and Pres-




based on model primitives.
Water-Speciﬁc Evidence
We now present evidence that two U.S. groups with mo-
nopolypower,theunionsoflongshoremeninNewOrleans
and on the Paciﬁc Coast, chose to operate inefficient tech-
nologies in the 19th and 20th centuries.
New Orleans. Some work rules of dock worker unions
in New Orleans are displayed in Table 5. Some of these
rules clearly lowered the productivity of work on the dock.
Consider, for example, the third work rule listed for the
cottonscrewmeninthe19thcentury.Recallthatthescrew-
menwereskilled workerswhoseskillconsistedofpacking
cotton into ships. But the third rule states that the cotton
screwmenwerealsotounloadtheriverboatsthathadcome
down the Mississippi, an unskilled task. Skilled labor em-
ployed at an unskilledtask is clearly aninefficient arrange-
ment. (These skilled workers were paid at screwmen’s
wages to do this unskilled work.)
Consider also two work rules in the 20th century which
reduced efficiency. The fourth work rules listed for the
screwmen and the second rule listed for the longshoremen
limitedtheuseofparticularequipmentintheirwork,clear-
ly another inefficient arrangement.
But the greatest loss in productivity resulted from the
screwmen’s blocking of new technology that was meant to
eliminate their job entirely. Technology was developed in
the early 1900s that allowed cotton to be dropped down a
chute or slide into the holds of ships. Often referred to as
“shoot the chute,” this technology had the promise of
greatly increasing the productivity of dock workers. It was
estimated that with this method, a crew of four or ﬁve men
could load 400–700 bales of cotton per day instead of the
75–90 bales that a gang of ﬁve plus a foreman could load
by hand. But the screwmen were able to signiﬁcantly slow
theadoptionofthistechnologyfordecades.(Fordetailson
these and related issues, see Arnesen 1991, pp. 163, 165–
69, 212–14.)
The Paciﬁc Coast. The monopoly power held by Pa-
ciﬁc Coast longshoremen unions also reduced efficiency
over the middle part of the 20th century.
While the longshoremen unions on the West Coast dat-
ed to the 19th century, they gained a signiﬁcant increase in
monopoly power in the mid-1930s, when they organized
a coastal union, the International Longshore and Ware-
house Union (ILWU). This union represented workers in
most ports along the coast, and it gained signiﬁcant control
of the work process.
Employers complained that after the formation of the
ILWU, the pace of work slowed signiﬁcantly and union
work rules were adopted that imposed additional costs on
the employer when mechanization was attempted. One
signiﬁcant change to slow work was to dramatically re-
duce the maximum weight of each bundle of cargo lifted
(the sling load). According to Mills and Wellman (1987,
p. 177), before the formation of the coastal union in 1934,
“the ‘general, breakbulk cargo’ sling-load . . . had been
4000–4400 pounds” in San Francisco. After the formation
of the union, a limit of 2,100 pounds was placed on these
sling loads (Mills and Wellman 1987, p. 183).
While such a limit on sling loads dramatically reduced
the amount of work done per hour, it also obviously had
a potential beneﬁt of reducing accidents on the job. But
there were even clearer cases of waste and inefficiency
tied to the unions. These were readily acknowledged by
the unions as work practices they insisted on which led to
inefficiencies.
One example of an inefficient work practice is the re-
quirement by the longshoremen that cargo moved by plat-
forms (pallets) be placed on the “skin of the dock” (Fergu-
son et al. 1961, p. 515, n. 6). The inefficiency of this was
acknowledged by the head of the ILWU, Harry Bridges, in
Congressional testimony, in response to a question aboutsuch practices. He said, “That is one of the practices we
have to get rid of. That is one of the practices that is
prevalent in San Pedro [California] we have to get rid of
because it is a waste of energy and hard work. It does not
make mechanization pay off” (quoted in Ferguson et al.
1961, pp. 515–16).
Another example is from a history of the ILWU (writ-
ten by the ILWU). This publication discusses the great
pressure unions felt to reform dock work practices when
employers began to take advantage of technological in-
novations in the late 1950s. With regard to this, the union
history states that “the union concluded that new methods
and machines would be introduced no matter how great
members’ resistance to change . . . . The union and the
employers...agreedthefollowingprincipleswouldshape
the1960contract:theshipownersandstevedoringcontrac-
tors were freed from restrictions on the introduction of
labor-saving devices, relieved of the use of unnecessary
workers, and assured of the elimination of work practices
which impeded the efficient ﬂow of cargo” (Vrana 1997).
Clearly, the union acknowledged that there were unneces-
sary workers on the docks.
In the middle part of the 20th century, then, employers
and unions agreed that union work practices reduced pro-
ductivity. While there isn’t a major study of productivity,
we can take a broad look at some numbers. In Chart 5, we
present the labor productivity of the Paciﬁc Coast long-
shoremen during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century (with
productivity measured by the number of tons loaded and
unloaded per worker hour). The years 1926 and 1933 are
before the coastal union was formed in 1934. Note that
workers’ productivity fell dramatically after that. The data
plotted in the chart do not control for the types of good
handled,theamountoftraffichandledbythevariousports,
and so on. They are admittedly only suggestive. But what
they show is not surprising, given the limit on sling loads
and other work practices imposed by the union.
Effects of Competition
Now we show that in the United States the competition of
railroads lessened the monopoly power of groups in the
watertransportindustryand thatthiscompetitionledtothe
loweringofpricesandthedroppingofinefficienttechnolo-
gies in this industry. We focus on the railroads’ inﬂuence
on the monopoly power of groups at holdup points since
we have the most evidence for these groups.
As we mentioned, U.S. water transportation systems
were susceptible to the creation of holdup points. But,
again, the monopoly power at such points was also sus-
ceptible to being weakened by railroads, which provided
an economical option to water transportation that had not
existedbefore.Oncethisoptionexisted,ifshipperswanted
toavoidholduppoints,theycould,bymovinggoodspartly
or totally by railroads. This competition had dramatic ef-
fects on the water transport industry.
Lower Prices
First we discuss how the development of railroads reduced
the power of dock worker unions, which inevitably led to
a reduction in water transport costs.
Railroad Competition Lowered Union Wages...
The competition of railroads took business away from
waterways and thus reduced monopoly wages in the U.S.
water transport industry. A prime example comes from the
port of New Orleans.
By the late 1880s, railroads were putting signiﬁcant
pressure on the docks in New Orleans. Some cotton was
going overland to New York, bypassing water altogether.
And some cotton was being shipped by train to New Or-
leans, thereby eliminating the unloading work of dock
workers.
To see an example of how quickly railroads eliminated
the unloading and other dock work, examine Chart 6. It
shows the amount of cotton arriving in New Orleans from
the Red River Valley area by water and by rail between
1878 and 1887. Whereas no cotton arrived by rail before
1881, by 1887 much more came by rail than by water (and
the amount of cotton coming by water had even decreased
in absolute terms).
The path of dock worker wages relative to other New
Orleans wages reﬂects this pressure from railroads. That
path between the mid-1880s and the mid-1900s is summa-
rized in Table 6. While screwmen’s wages fell more than
16 percent and longshoremen’s wages fell 20 percent over
this period, the wages of freight handlers for the Illinois
Central Railroad increased nearly 7 percent.
A large share of these drops in New Orleans dock
worker wages probably was due to the railroad competi-
tion. The drops were certainly not due to a general decline
in wages in the nation or the region. At the time dock
worker wages were falling, the wages of workers in other
industries were rising. We do not have good wage data to
compare the wages through time of particular types of
workers in New Orleans, like teamsters, machinists, and
engineers.
17 But aggregate data series are suggestive. Be-
tween 1890 and 1905, for example, when dock worker
wages were falling, the average hourly wages in U.S.
manufacturing industries rose 20 percent, and average
annual earnings in all U.S. industries rose 14 percent. At
the same time, average aggregate wages in the U.S. South
were keeping up with those in the nation (Rosenbloom
1990, p. 94, Table 2). Hence, at neither the national level
nor the regional level were wages feeling the signiﬁcant
downward pressure that is apparent in the wages of New
Orleans dock workers.
. . . Lowered Warehouse Fees...
Late in the 19th century, railroad competition also affected
other dock charges. In his analysis of wheat prices in the
19th century, Veblen (1892, pp. 89–90) discusses the mar-
ket power of warehousemen in the Buffalo water transport




Railroad competition with the Erie canal system threatened
to divert the grain trade from that route to other ports, as
Philadelphia and Baltimore, and this led to close scrutiny of




tual monopoly long possessed by the Erie Canal route, came
to light. It was found that the charges, at Buffalo perhaps
more elaborately than elsewhere, had been ingeniously ar-
ranged to take as high toll as might be on every bushel ....
Underthestressofnecessitythemiddle-men,whodrewtheir
income from the traffic, gradually and reluctantly lowered
their charges during the seventies to a point at which their
amount would no longer work to the manifest detriment ofthe traffic.
...P r evented Union Wage Increases...
Early in the 20th century, railroads were used to break
dock worker strikes, thus preventing the unions from in-
creasing their already high wages. We present just a few
examples here.
Because of labor unrest in New Orleans in 1902–3,
Arnesen (1987, p. 161) reports, shipping lines rerouted
ships away from the port of New Orleans to other gulf
ports. This diversion was economical only because there
were railroads.
In Boston, a 1912 strike of longshoremen was broken.
To defeat the strike, employers used strikebreakers, but
also the diversion of traffic to prevent longshoremen from
achieving their wage demands in the strikes. According to
McLaughlin (1998), “when the strike began, the employ-
ers’ organization announced that freight being transported
by rail to Boston from the west would be re-routed to New
York, Baltimore, and Portland, and New-England bound
ocean freight would be re-routed to New York.”
On the Paciﬁc Coast, Vrana (1997) reports, “shipown-
ers . . . imported African Americans as strikebreakers
against the white trade unionists, or diverted cargo away
from a struck port to be worked by members of a different
local....T h eshipowners used these tactics to divide and
destroylongshoreunionsonthe PaciﬁcCoastinthestrikes
of 1916, 1919 and 1921.”
. . . And Reduced Union Royalties
In the middle of the 20th century, railroad competition also
led labor unions to make more concessions to their em-
ployers,includingloweringtheirownchargestoemployers
for permitting new technology to be used on the job.
In the late 1950s, for example, a new technology was
beingintroducedinto watertransportationthat promisedto
reduce port charges signiﬁcantly. For the ﬁrst time, freight
was being put in containers, which could be more easily
loadedandunloadedfromships—andwithfewerworkers.
The use of containers thus signiﬁcantly reduced handling
costs in ports.
Dock workers understandably did not like this innova-
tion. While the longshoremen on the West and East coasts
hadpowerfulunionsinthe1950s andinitiallyattemptedto
ﬁght it, they ultimately conceded the employers’ right to
introduce containers into dock work in return for some ﬁ-
nancial rewards. On the West Coast, generous severance
payments were given to longshoremen who chose to retire
early.
On the East Coast, shippers agreed to give longshore-
men a royalty per ton for freight that arrived in containers.
This dock worker union recognized, however, that this in-
novation provided some hope that coastal shipping could
recover some of the market that had been captured by
trains and trucks. Hence, this union agreed to charge a
smaller royalty per ton on containers from ships in the
coastal domestic market than from those in the foreign
market. The royalties on domestic containers were small,
as much as one-quarter of those on foreign containers.
The dock worker union agreed to reduce its royalties
because it hoped that these smaller charges would help the
water transport industry compete with railroads.
The schedule of royalty payments to the International
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) workers in New York
in the early 1960s is illustrative (Goldberg 1973, p. 261).
In this area, royalties on containers in the foreign trade
wereafunction ofthedegreeofautomation oftheshipand
ranged from 35¢ per ton for conventional ships to 70¢ per
ton for partially automated ships to $1 per ton for the most
automated ships. At the same time, for all coastal domestic
containers, the royalty was just 28¢ per ton. Hence, on the
most automated ships, the foreign charge was nearly four
times the domestic charge.
Fewer Inefficient Technologies
Now we demonstrate that lower prices is not all that the
development of railroads accomplished in the U.S. water
transport industry. It also led groups in this industry with
monopoly power to drop some inefficient technologies.
We ﬁrst demonstrate that this sort of effect is possible by
describing some evidence from outside the water transport
industry. Then we give a few speciﬁc water transport ex-
amples.
Non-Water Industry Evidence
A clear example of increases in competition leading some
groups with monopoly power to drop inefficient technolo-
gies comes from the world iron ore market. Galdon-
Sanchez and Schmitz (2000) show that the collapse in
world steel production in the early 1980s meant that iron
ore mines in some countries were under signiﬁcant threat
of closure. Around this time, in most of these countries,
iron ore labor productivity doubled in just a few years.
Much of the gains are attributed to changes in work rules.
The iron ore industry in the United States illustrates this
effect.Schmitz(2001)demonstratesthatworkrulechanges
played the major role in the doubling of U.S. iron ore pro-
ductivity.These workrulechanges ledtoanincrease inthe
effort per hour worked and a decrease in the amount of re-
dundant effort at the mines.
Water Industry Evidence
Workers in the U.S. water transport industry also accepted
changes in how they worked in order to become more ef-
ﬁcient and make transportation by water more competitive
with railroads.
In New Orleans, for example, in the mid-1900s, the
screwmen’s union agreed to increase the limit on the rate
at which they would screw cotton into oceangoing ships.
The maximum rate increased from 75 to 90 bales per gang
per day, an increase of 20 percent. (Recall Table 5.) These
skilledscrewmenalsogaveuptheright tounloadcottonas
well as load it. (See their third work rule on Table 5.)
Since screwmen were skilled and unloading was an un-
skilled task, this change clearly improved the efficiency of
how workers in the water transport industry were used.
Work rule changes were made on the East and West
coasts as well. Around the middle of the 20th century,
remember, the ILA agreed to reduce the royalties it
charged on domestic traffic in order to try to regain some
of the market lost to railroads. That competition also led
this union to accept a reduction in the number of workers
used on certain types of jobs. The use of containers had
reduced the number required for some jobs, and the union
did not try to maintain its existing rules. As Goldberg
(1973, p. 261) says, “recognising that container operations
held out the promise of reviving the near-defunct domestic
coastwise and inter-coastal trades, the ILA agreed to a re-
duction in the number of gangs required on board ship forthe new domestic trade operations.”
The Overall Contribution of Railroads?
We have demonstrated that the introduction of railroads
signiﬁcantly reduced the effects of monopoly in the water
transport system in the United States. Until now, this con-
tribution of railroads has not been recognized by re-
searchers. They have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that
without railroads, the U.S. long-distance transportation in-
dustry would have been competitive, not monopolistic.
Therefore, any quantitative estimates researchers have
made about the contribution of railroads to U.S. economic
growth are likely to be far too small. Here we look at one
prominent researcher’s estimate and attempt to determine,
at least qualitatively, how far off it might be.
Fogel’s Calculation
Fogel (1964) is the ﬁrst researcher to attempt to quantify
the contribution of railroads to U.S. economic growth. (He
won a Nobel Prize for this and subsequent work.) He
chooses a year at the end of the 19th century, 1890, and
asks, How much lower would U.S. gross national product
(GNP) in 1890 have been if railroads had not been intro-
duced by then? As Fogel argues, an upper bound to this
loss is the extra cost that the nation would have had to pay
to transport the same goods that actually had been trans-
ported in 1890, to the same places, but under the assump-
tion that railroads had not been introduced.
A Necessary Assumption
In order to quantitatively estimate this cost, Fogel needed
to take a stand on how prices and productivity in the water
transport industry would have evolved without railroads.
That is, he needed a theory about how the water transport
industry operated. The theory he chose is competitive the-
ory.
According to this theory, the long-run prices and pro-
ductivity in the water transport industry would have
evolved independently of those in the railroad industry.
Under certain assumptions, then, if there had been no
railroad, water transport prices in 1890 would have been
the prices that actually were charged in that year.
19 If that
were true, then calculating the extra cost of shipping some
number of units of a good by water as opposed to by rail-
road required simply multiplying that number by the dif-
ference between the 1890 water and rail prices.
Fogel does this. He starts by restricting his attention to
agricultural goods in general and then to four of the major
goods: wheat, corn, beef, and pork. He approximates the
total quantity of each of these goods moved over each of
the main transportation routes. He then asks how much
greater the cost of transporting these same quantities of
goods, over these same routes, would have been if rail-
roads had not been developed. Again, this extra cost is an
upper bound to the loss in national income if railroads had
not been developed. The extra costs could have been
smaller since without railroads, agricultural production
could have been relocated or otherwise reconﬁgured to
make shipment to market less costly.
Fogel splits the calculation of the extra cost of trans-
portingagriculturalgoodsintotwoparts.Heﬁrstcalculates
the extra cost on long hauls, that is, on interregional ship-
ments of goods, for example, from Chicago to New York.
To make these shipments, water would have been used if
rails had not been developed. The cost of not having rail-
roads for interregional shipments is estimated by Fogel to
be 0.6 percent of 1890 GNP. Fogel then calculates the
extra cost on short hauls, that is, on intraregional ship-
ments, for example, from a farm in Illinois to the city of
Chicago. For short hauls, water and wagon would have
been used if rails had not been developed, and wagons
were an extremely expensive form of transportation.
Fogel’s estimate of the extra cost for intraregional ship-
ments is twice that for interregional shipments: 1.2 percent
of 1890 GNP. Hence, Fogel’s total estimated extra cost
for transporting these major agricultural goods is the sum
of the two estimates (0.6 + 1.2), or 1.8 percent of GNP.
Interregional Detail
Let us describe in a bit more detail Fogel’s interregional
calculation. Let xr denote the quantity of wheat shipped
interregionally by rail in 1890 over a particular route. Let







rail transport, including a longer shipment time; a greater
insurance cost; greater storage costs, because water routes
were closed in the winter; and the necessary extra cost of
manytransshipmentsalongtheway.Fogelpricesthesedis-
advantages andcomes upwith anumber c
x
wwhichis anes-
timate of these additional costs of shipping by water rather
than rail.
20 Hence, the extra costs of shipping by water the









By summing these extra costs across goods and inter-
regional routes, Fogel arrives at his estimate of the extra
cost of making interregional shipments if railroads had not
been developed.
The Total Contribution
Again, Fogel estimates that the extra cost of moving agri-
cultural goods by water and wagons alone in 1890 to be
1.8 percent of GNP. While Fogel does not calculate the
extra cost of moving nonagricultural goods by water and
wagon alone, he speculates about what that cost would
have been (1964, pp. 219–24). Fogel then suggests that the
extra cost for all goods, agricultural and otherwise, would
very likely not have exceeded 5 percent of GNP. In other
words, Fogel concludes that railroads contributed at most
5 percent to U.S. national income in 1890.
Objections
Fogel’s use of competitive theory to approximate the
workings of the U.S. water transport industry has not gone
unchallenged.Forexample,McClelland(1968)hasargued
that without railroads, there would have been monopoly
power on the canals and, hence, higher transport prices in
the period Fogel is studying.
Fogel (1979) has had two responses to this argument.
First, Fogel says brieﬂy that to the extent canal boat own-
ers did have monopoly power and raised prices, this was
an income transfer, not a social cost, and he is only in-
terested in social costs (Fogel 1979, p. 19, n. 27). But
monopolies distort output, and that distortion has social
costs.Whilethesecostshaveoftenbeencalculatedasquite
small, they need not be.
Fogel’s second point, his main point, is that monopolypower was an irrelevant issue on the canals in the 19th
century, at least in the United States. Fogel argues that
there was free entry on the canals and that the competitive
abstraction was a reasonable one for the Erie Canal.
ButFogelusesthecompetitiveabstractionfortheentire
water industry, not just the canal routes.
21 And the Erie
Canal carried a relatively small part of the U.S. goods
moved by water, as Chart 7 shows. Yet, as far as we can
tell,therehasbeen littledebateaboutthe reasonablenessof
Fogel’s competitive assumption. Fogel (1979) himself
makes only brief reference to it. After discussing the canal
monopoly issue, Fogel (1979, p. 21) makes a much more
general claim about 19th century water transportation. He
argues that
IntheAmericancase,partiesonallsidesofthetransportation
debates of the nineteenth century agreed that it was the com-
petitive pressure of waterways that kept railroad rates low,
rather than the competitive pressure of railroads that kept
waterway rates low.
Fogel seems to be saying here that in the 19th century, mo-
nopoly power was not an issue anywhere in the U.S. water
transport system.
Toward a New Number
If Fogel is wrong in his competitive assumption, then he is
underestimating the contribution that railroads made to
U.S. economic growth. Our historical analysis above has
demonstrated that Fogel’s assumption is inappropriate; the
U.S. water transport industry had a monopolistic tendency,
andtheentryofrailroadsloweredpricesandmadetechnol-
ogy less inefficient in the long-distance transportation in-
dustry. Quantitatively taking account of this overlooked
contribution of railroads to come up with a new number is
beyond our scope here. But we can describe how to qual-
itatively see that such an exercise may yield a much larger
number than Fogel’s 5 percent. First, we look at Fogel’s
method with monopoly; that is, we calculate the extra cost
of transportation with monopoly. Some may say that by
doing this, we are simply calculating transfers and not
social costs. But we think the exercise is instructive, and at
least some fraction of the extra cost of transportation with
monopoly must be social costs. Second, we argue that this
fraction may well be large, by discussing recent work on
the costs of monopoly.
Before sketching Fogel’s calculation with monopoly,
however, let us ﬁrst conjecture that calculating the extra
cost of transporting goods without railroads, when we rec-
ognize monopoly, will not necessarily produce an upper
bound to the actual cost, as it did when there was no
monopoly. Without monopoly, the logic as to why such a
calculation provides an upper bound is clear. We can apply
the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems about the equiva-
lence between competitive equilibria and social planner
problems and then think of a planner who can decide to
move the location of agricultural production if and only if
income is increased. But with monopoly, the welfare the-
orems go out the window, and this argument is no longer
applicable.
Fogel’s Calculation With Monopoly
To make Fogel’s calculation with monopoly, let’s call the
monopoly water transport price and extra cost that would





tively, and note that these variables are greater than their
competitive counterparts by deﬁnition. With a water trans-
port monopoly, the extra cost of not having railroads for
interregional wheat shipments that actually had been made








Because the monopoly variables are greater than the com-
petitive variables, the extra cost (2) is obviously greater
than Fogel’s extra cost (1). With monopoly, we must add
to this an extra cost of making wheat shipments that had











But this is not all. Recall that Fogel considered only
four agricultural goods. He ignored some agricultural
goods because they were primarily carried by water, and
the only costs he calculated involved shifting goods from
railroads to water. The primary example here is cotton.
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Fogel ignores shipments of cotton because a lot of it was
transportedbywater,andheassumeswatertransportprices
were competitive. But since competition from railroads
was pushing down the monopoly price of shipping cotton,
Fogel’s calculation misses a signiﬁcant income boost from
the development of railroads.











The extent to which the calculation that recognizes mo-
nopoly exceeds the calculation that does not depends, of
course, on the extent to which railroads reduced the water
transport industry’s tendency toward monopoly in long-
distance transportation. It also depends on the year of the
calculation since railroads entered the various regions of
the United States at different rates. As time passed, rail-
roads became denser and thus had a greater impact on the
water transport monopoly.
The extra cost of shipping without railroads when mo-
nopoly is recognized, relative to the extra cost when mo-
nopoly is ignored, then, involves summing terms like (2),
(3), and (4) and dividing the result by terms like (1). If we







































This is the water transport price with monopoly relative to
the water transport price with railroad competition.
We have shown that in the United States many water
transport charges were two and three times the competi-
tive levels. While our evidence is for charges at transship-
ment points, such magnitudes may well have prevailed on
other parts of the system as well. Moreover, transshipment
charges were a large share of total shipping charges.
So the idea that the level of water transport prices with-out railroads may have been twice the level of prices with
rail competition may not be unreasonable. Fogel uses the
1890 water and rail transport prices between Chicago and
New York as representative of the country. Both of these
prices certainly fell dramatically in the second half of the
19th century, during the period of intense competition
between water and rail transportation. This can be seen for
wheat shipment prices, adjusted for inﬂation, in Chart 8.
Note that Fogel uses a water transshipment charge of
50¢ a ton in his calculations. We have seen in Table 4
that in New Orleans the charge on cotton was much high-
er. In the mid-1880s, cotton screwmen there charged 41¢
to load a bale of cotton. Since a bale weighs about 500
pounds, the screwmen loading charge was $1.64 a ton.
And recall, this is the charge for only the last task on the
dock. On Table 4 we have seen that the smallest per bale
unloading and loading charge is $1.01, which amounts to
about $4.00 a ton. But unloading and loading charges
were not all the charges in the port. There were also
charges for teamsters (draymen) and cotton yardmen, for
example. Hester (1896) puts the draymen charges in 1895
at 20¢ a bale, or 80¢ a ton. (See Table 3.) In 1885, the
draymen charges were likely larger. Hence, the transship-
ment charge for a ton of cotton in New Orleans in 1885
was probably about $5.00—10 times Fogel’s charge.
Most of this difference may well have been due to the
extremely strong monopoly held by the dock worker
unions in New Orleans. The strength of this monopoly
stemmed from the lack of long-distance transportation
alternatives at this time and the fact that cotton was grown
close to New Orleans. But the New Orleans monopoly
gives us some idea of the power that unions and combina-
tions elsewhere with some monopoly power could have
developed if railroads and other long-distance transporta-
tion alternatives had not been developed.
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Using Applied General Equilibrium
While making Fogel’s calculation with monopoly is sug-
gestive, it is, of course, no substitute for using quantitative
general equilibrium theory to answer Fogel’s question
about the contribution of railroads. In future work, we plan
to do that—to make a direct quantitative calculation of
what the loss in U.S. national income would have been
withoutrailroads,recognizingthattheylimitedthemonop-
olistic tendencies in the U.S. long-distance transportation
industry. Here we brieﬂy discuss some recent advances in
theory which suggest that the costs of monopoly in that in-
dustry could have been large.
By charging high prices, a monopolist distorts output,
and this has allocative efficiency consequences. Such wel-
fare losses, Harberger triangles, are typically thought to be
small. But they may not be. The competition of railroads
reduced monopoly prices signiﬁcantly (more than in typ-
ical calculations) and led to less inefficient technologies
(ignored in typical calculations).
But just as important, a monopoly in transportation is a
particular cause of concern because it limits trade between
regions. Several recent studies suggest that the welfare
losses from this sort of monopoly, which can be thought of
as akin to higher tariffs, may be large.
Romer (1994) examines the distortions caused by tar-
iffs, which are formally equivalent to transportation prices
in his model. He concludes that the welfare cost of the re-
duction in product variety can, in principle, substantially
outweigh the welfare cost of the Harberger triangle output
distortions from tariffs. Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(1997) have quantitatively studied the cost of reduced
product variety caused by higher tariffs.
High monopoly transport prices can also foster monop-
oly in other industries. Holmes and Schmitz (1995, 2001)
show that by lowering tariffs between areas, which is
equivalent to lowering the price of transportation, compe-
tition is increased in other sectors. They argue that this
increased competition can lead to productivity gains in
othersectors as,forexample, inefficientworkpractices are
abandoned.
Investment in an industry will also be affected by mo-
nopoly pricing (Grossman and Hart 1986, Farrell and
Gallini 1988, Williamson 1989, and McLaren 2000). The
problem arises when there is limited commitment by
agents. Holmes (1990) discusses how a monopoly in gas-
oline, together with a limited ability of the gasoline mo-
nopolist to commit to low future prices of gasoline, will
lead to inefficiently low investment in capital goods (for
example, cars) that use gasoline. In the same way, a mo-
nopoly in water transportation will lead to inefficient in-
vestment in the types of capital (for example, factories and
farm infrastructure) that use water transportation as a com-
plementary input.
Conclusion
By examining the U.S. long-distance transportation in-
dustry in the 19th and 20th centuries, we have seen com-
petition at work. We have demonstrated two main things:
(1) that monopoly has been pervasive in the U.S. water
transportindustryandhasledtopriceshigherthancompet-
itive levels plus the use of technologies less efficient than
could have been used and (2) that competition from rail-
roads greatly reduced the power of this monopoly, which
is evident in lower prices and less inefficiency in the water
transport industry.
Unlike Fogel (1964), we have not yet produced an es-
timate of how much the development of railroads contrib-
uted to U.S. economic growth. Fogel famously boiled
down his analysis of that contribution to a number. In his
estimate, the development of railroads had a value to the
1890 U.S. economy of no more than 5 percent of GNP.
But Fogel worked in a competitive framework, ignoring
the monopoly in the long-distance transportation industry.
In future work, we plan to attempt to come up with a new
number that takes into account the weakening of that
monopoly. We expect that this work may lead to a sub-
stantial upward revision of Fogel’s estimate.
One way to get a sense of what the new number might
be is to do what Fogel did—and one of the things we did
in this article: examine the available data for a representa-
tive area. Fogel extrapolates from the shipment of grain
between Chicago and New York; we can extrapolate from
the movement of cotton through the New Orleans dock.
Weareassumingthatwhat washappeninginNewOrleans
intheearly1880s(beforerailroadsmadebiginroadsthere)
is indicative of what would have happened in the rest of
the country if railroads had not been developed. We have
seenthatwatertransportpricesinNewOrleanswereabout
twicecompetitivelevelsandthatunion restrictionsonhow
to do dock work lowered productivity there, perhaps by
one-half.
We don’t know yet what the value to the U.S. economyasawholewouldbefromhalvingthetotalU.S.transporta-
tion cost and reducing the use of inefficient technology.
Rather than throw out a new number here, we will end by
pointing out that the transportation sector is a special sec-
tor, closely linked to the rest of the economy. Changes in
thissector reverberatewidely. Atthe least,improvedtrans-
portation increases specialization and competition in other
sectors. These beneﬁts thus magnify the beneﬁts of re-
source savings from simple reductions in the cost of trans-
portation.
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1So have trucks, but we focus on railroads.
2If a series of canals running from Chicago to New York, Philadelphia, and so on
could have been built, just like a series of railroads were built from the East to the
West in the United States, then there would have been more water transport systems
and less chance of holdup points being created. But there were signiﬁcant problems for
canal traffic crossing the Appalachian and other mountains, and such a series of canals
may not have been much of an option.
3On a river route, a boat goes right past every city along the route. This makes de-
ﬁning markets hard, since a boat on a route from St. Paul, Minnesota, to New Orleans
goes right by St. Louis and so in some sense is in the St. Paul–St. Louis market as
well. But along a coast, cities can be deep in a bay or upriver. So a steamship on a
route from New York to Norfolk could stop at Baltimore or Philadelphia, but doing
that would take the ship substantially out of its way.
4This was not the situation everywhere in this industry. On the Erie Canal, the ef-
ﬁcient scale of production was small relative to the size of the market. This business
could be entered with a single barge. The market primarily was the shipment of grain
from Buffalo to Albany. Massive amounts of grain moved over this route, so the size
of the market was large relative to the scale of efficient production.
5All officers had to be U.S. citizens, for example.
6These unions were not particularly strong (and may have weakened throughout
the latter part of the 19th century), but that may well have been because of the new
competition from railroads, which cut the demand for new ships.
7The Alexander Commission (U.S. Congress 1914) reported that around 1913, of
all the steamers and tonnage employed in the Atlantic and Gulf coast trades by regular
lines (that is, excluding the steamers of some “very small and purely local lines”), the
Eastern Steamboat Corporation owned 11.3 percent of the steamers and 10 percent of
the tonnage and the Atlantic, Gulf & West Indies Steamship Lines owned 18.2 percent
of the steamers and 22 percent of the tonnage. These two steamship lines, therefore,
owned about one-third of the tonnage. The rest of the tonnage was owned by railroads.
While the commission’s report does not provide a complete breakdown of railroad
holdings of steamships, a few points can be made. The Morgan steamship line, owned
by the Southern Paciﬁc Co. (a railroad), owned 9 percent of the steamers and 17
percent of the tonnage (U.S. Congress 1914, pp. 389–90). The New York, New Haven
& Hartford R.R. Co. owned many steamship lines. One was the Merchants & Miners
Transportation Co., which owned 11 percent of the steamers and 12 percent of the ton-
nage.
Hence, based on just the partial data available, the two steamship line combina-
tions, together with these two railroads, the Southern Paciﬁc and the New York, New
Haven & Hartford, owned at least 60 percent of the steamship tonnage. More likely,
they owned much more than that.
8This pattern of one shipping line serving a city-pair is also consistent with our
argument that scale of entry in this industry was large relative to the market.
9The Southern Steamship Co. was part of the Atlantic, Gulf & West Indies Steam-
ship Lines combination.
10Below we show, with more limited data, that dock worker wage premiums in
New Orleans were even greater 20 years earlier.
11For Chart 3 and several of the other quantitative charts and tables, we have com-
piled some detailed notes. These are available on request.
12Dock workers did not earn more than all unionized workers. For example, the
Louisiana report (Lee 1906) lists wages of 63¢ an hour for plumbers and 75¢ an hour
for bricklayers.
13This average is calculated as an unweighted arithmetic average across sub-
industries in the manufacturing sector. The averages below are also calculated as un-
weighted arithmetic averages.
14U.S. Treasury Department 1888 reports a range of steamship freight charges
from New Orleans to New York for 1885.
15Though the screwmen’s skill was in loading cotton onto vessels, they also had
demanded and won the right to unload vessels (even though this was an unskilled job,
as we shall see below).
16In these calculations, we are using wages of longshoremen and screwmen in the
mid-1880s, which are given in Table 6 below.
17For the middle 1880s, for example, there are data on wages for some of these
groups in one publication (U.S. Labor Department 1898). And for the middle 1900s,
there are data on wages for some of the groups in another publication (U.S. Labor
Department1906).Butthesamplesforthesetwoperiodsaredrawnfromsuchdifferent
populations that comparing them does not seem appropriate.
18It seems to have been a widespread view that there was an elevator monopoly
at Buffalo. Ellis (1948, p. 287) argues that “the elevator monopoly in that city [Buf-
falo] came in for much criticism for the next decade,” by which he meant the 1870s.
19Two assumptions are needed for this result. First, as the water transport industry
expanded, costs in the industry had to be nonincreasing. (The industry should have had
a nonincreasing long-run marginal cost curve.) Fogel (1979) presents evidence that, if
anything, the water transport industry was a decreasing marginal cost industry. Second,
the year 1890 had to have been one in which the water transport industry had adjusted
to the railroad. In a competitive industry, the owners of capital will continue to operate
capital as long as prices cover variable costs, but will no longer make new investments
if that’s all they cover. The assumption is that by 1890, water prices covered variable
and capital costs.
20Fogel (1964) also adds an estimate of the capital costs of canals in cw since tolls
on the Erie Canal were eliminated by 1890.
21Fogel (1979) argues that the Erie Canal system was competitive in 1890. But as
we argue above, substantial monopoly power can be exercised over a trade route even
if portions of the route are competitive. Hence, knowledge about the competitive con-
ditions on one segment of a route tells us nothing about the competitive conditions over
the entire route.
22Wheat, corn, beef, and pork accounted for 42 percent of the income originating
in U.S. agriculture in 1889. Cotton accounted for 11 percent (Fogel 1964, p. 25).
23It is true, of course, that cotton and other agricultural goods, like grains, are dif-
ferent, and most others are easier to handle than cotton. Some of the extra cost in cot-
ton handling may have been due to this difference. Recall, however, that there were a
lot of union restrictions on the use of equipment in handling cotton in New Orleans
which themselves increased the handling cost. Recall also that in the early 1900s, a ma-
jortechnologicalinnovationthatmadecottonhandlingmorelikegrainhandling(“shoot
the chute”) was blocked by the cotton screwmen.
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Chart 4    . . . And Elsewhere
Hourly Wage Rates (Cents) of Freight Handlers in Dock, Railroad, and Lumber Industries 
in New York and on the Great Lakes in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
(range) (range) (range)
Sources: Commons 1905, pp. 66, 73; Barnes 1915, p. 96; Kleven 1941, pp. 453–54 *Gaps in plots are due to unavailable data.
 Source: Ferguson et al. 1961, p. 519
Chart 5
Productivity of U.S. Pacific Coast Longshoremen 
Tons per Worker Hour Loaded and Unloaded, Annually Between 1926 and 1953*
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Chart 6
How Fast Railroads Took Over 
the Transportation of Cotton 
Amount of Cotton Arriving in New Orleans From the Red River Valley 
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Suggestive Evidence of Scale Economies 
in U.S. Coastal Shipping
Steamship Lines Operating Between Baltimore and Other Ports








Steamships Lines Serving Each Port
Chesapeake Bay Ports
  Havre de Grace, Md.   Baltimore and Susquehanna    2  30
  Chestertown, Md.   Chester River    2  30
  Annapolis, Md.   Eastern Shore    7  50
  Patuxent River, Md.   Weems    4  20
  Alexandria, Va., and
  Washington, D.C.   Potomac    1  10
  York River, Va.   Richmond, York River    5  45
Southern Ports
  Norfolk, Va.   Baltimore Steam Packet    7  60
  Roanoke River, N.C.   Baltimore and Roanoke    4  5
  New Berne, N.C.   New Berne   3  10
  Charleston, S.C.   Merchants   3  6
  Savannah, Ga.   Merchants and Miners     12*   6
*The Merchants and Miners Transportation Company used 12 steamships 
  between Baltimore and the four ports it served from there.
  Source: U.S. Treasury Department 1881, pp. 116–17
Northern Ports
  Boston, Mass.   Merchants and Miners    12*  8
  Providence, R.I.   Merchants and Miners    12*  8
  New York, N.Y.   Merchants and Miners    12*  8
    New York and Baltimore    7  30
  Philadelphia, Penn.   Baltimore and Philadelphia    6  30Table 2
U.S. Dock Worker Jobs Were Valuable
Approximate Time for Various Workers to Earn
$50 Initiation Fee for Dock and AFL Unions
in the Late 19th Century and the Early 20th Century
Hours Needed to Earn Fee at
Year    Union   Railroad Wages     Unskilled Wages
1884   Cotton Screwmen  333  500
    New Orleans
Early 1900s   Longshoremen  250–90  333
    Great Lakes
1946   AFL Unions  46  49
Sources: Commons 1905, Kleven 1941, Taft 1946, 
    U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975,  Arnesen 1991Table 3
Estimates of Water Shipping Charges
On Two U.S. Water Routes in the Late 19th Century*
  Northern Route:   Southern Route:
Type of Charge  Chicago to New York**    New Orleans to New York 
Port Charges  Commissions at Chicago   1.5¢  Drayage and Storage for 30 Days  $ .35
  Storage in Chicago   2.5    Extra Storage for 30 Days   .10
  Elevator at Buffalo   2.0    Compressing   .50
  Commissions at Buffalo   1.5    Drayage† to Shipside   .20
  Expenses in New York   3.0    Insurance for 60 Days   .24
      Screwing into Ship   .50
      Wharfage, Tarpaulin, etc.   .15
            Total Port Charges   $2.04
Freight Charges  To Buffalo    6.5¢  To New York   $1.25–$2.00
  To New York by Canal   13.5 
     Total Freight Charges   $1.25–$2.00
  Total Freight Charges   20.0¢
 * The charges on the northern route are for about 1870; those for the southern route, 
  1895 (port) and 1885 (freight).
**On the northern route, cargo had other per bushel charges besides: 0.25¢ for inspection 
  in Chicago and 1.25¢ for insurance.
 † Drayage is work by dock teamsters, or draymen.
  Sources: U.S. Treasury Department 1888, Hester 1896, Lee 1938
Dollars per
Bale of Cotton
Total Port Charges                     10.5¢
Cents per
Bushel of GrainTable 4
A New Estimate of Water Shipping Charges 
and Monopoly Profit on the U.S. Southern Route
Charges for Moving a Bale of Cotton From New Orleans to New York
by Steamship in 1885 and Percentage of That Estimated to Be Monopoly Profit 
for Dock Workers
Type of Work  
and Worker  100 Bales / 0.5 75 Bales / 1.0 
Unloading
  Screwmen   $ .41    $ .31
  Longshoremen   .33    .125
Loading
  Screwmen   .41    .41
  Longshoremen   .33    .167
Total Unloading and 
Loading Charges
  Unloading   .74    .435
  Loading   .74    .577
  Total   $1.48    $1.01
Steamship 
Freight Charges
  Low   $1.25    $1.25  
  High   2.00    2.00
Total Shipping Charges 
With Freight Charges
  Low   $2.73    $2.26
  High   3.48    3.01
Estimated Monopoly Profit for Dock Workers
(% of Total Shipping Charges)
With Freight Charges
  Low   31%   24%
  High   24    18
*The rate of unloading is in terms of bales per day per 5-man gang.
  Screwmen loaded at 75 bales per day per gang.
  Source: U.S. Treasury Department 1888
Charges ($ per Bale) Assuming 
Alternative Rates Screwmen Unloaded Riverboats*
and Ratios of Workers (Longshoremen / Screwmen)Table 5
Some Work Rules of New Orleans Dock Worker Unions
In the 19th and 20th Centuries
Rules in Each Time Period
Type of Worker Type of Work Rule Mid-1880s Mid-1900s
Cotton Screwmen   1. Limit on amount of work per shift     Gang of screwmen to load no more   Gang to load no more than 
        than 75 bales of flat cotton with screws   90 bales of cotton per shift 
        
    n.a.   Gang to load no more than
      80 casks of tobacco per shift
 2. Fine for exceeding work limit    n.a.   $50 fine for exceeding cotton 
         or tobacco limit on first offense; 
    expulsion from union on second
 3. Work creation   Screwmen not only to load cotton into   Screwmen only to load cotton into 
  oceangoing vessels, but also to unload    oceangoing vessels; to unload only
     cotton from riverboats   in emergencies (like fire), with $25  
    fine per gang per day for violation
 4. Limit on equipment use   n.a.   Sling loads limited to 3 round bales 
    of cotton and 2 bales of flat cotton, 
    with $25 fine for violation
   
  n.a.   No top hooks to be used in any 
    vessel being stowed by hand; $50 
    fine on first offense, explusion 
    from union on second
Longshoremen   1. Limit on amount of work per shift   Longshoremen to work at same   n.a.
           pace as screwmen  
   
 
  2. Limit on equipment use   n.a.   Minimum of 2 workers required for
          any work performed using trucks,
          except work with cotton, hemp, 
          railroad iron, and pig copper
n.a. = not available
Sources: Lee 1906, Arnesen 1991Table 6
How Wages Changed Over Time in New Orleans
Hourly Wages Between the Mid-1880s and the Mid-1900s
Hourly Wages Paid in
Type of Worker ￿ Mid-1880s ￿ Mid-1900s ￿ % Change
New Orleans Workers
On Docks
￿ Cotton Screwmen￿ 67¢￿ 56¢￿ –16.4%
￿ Longshoremen￿ 50  ￿ 40  ￿ –20.0
On Railroads
￿ Freight Handlers*￿ 15¢￿ 16¢￿ 6.7%
U.S. Workers 
￿ Average Hourly Earnings**
￿ All Manufacturing Industries￿ 20¢￿ 24¢￿ 20.0%
￿ Average Annual Earnings**
￿ All Industries￿ $486￿ $554￿ 14.0%
  *These are workers at the Illinois Central Railroad.
 **These are earnings in 1890 and 1905.
￿ Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, Arnesen 1991